FOURTEENTH ANNUAL GROTIUS LECTURE
CONFRONTING COMPLEXITY
THROUGH LAW:
THE CASE FOR REASON, VISION,
AND HUMANITY*
DR. JAKOB KELLENBERGER**
President Caron and Professor Hunter, distinguished scholars and
practitioners, members of the American Society of International
Law, ladies and gentlemen,
It is great honour for me to have been invited to deliver the
Fourteenth Annual Grotius Lecture at the invitation of the American
Society of International Law and the International Legal Studies
Program of American University Washington College of Law. It is
likewise a great pleasure to be speaking before the annual meeting of
the American Society of International Law, which has for so many
decades been dedicated to enabling open and creative discussions of
the outstanding legal issues of the day. It must be admitted, however,
that addressing the opening of an ASIL meeting entitled
“Confronting Complexity” presents a great challenge, for the general
theme seems to aptly encapsulate both the times we live in, which
are undoubtedly complex, and calls on me to try to outline how we
might deal with complexity.
It should come as no surprise that my remarks will primarily focus
on the role of the law in confronting the complexity of violence, and
particularly the role of international humanitarian law in confronting
the complexity of armed conflict. It is fitting, in this context, to pay
tribute to Hugo Grotius. In line with principles established by his
* Delivered to the 106th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International
Law, Fourteenth Annual Grotius Lecture Series, Washington, DC, March 28, 2012.
** President of the International Committee of the Red Cross.
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Spanish and Italian intellectual counterparts Francisco de Vitoria and
Alberico Gentili, he laid the foundations of international law, and in
his timeless treatise On the Law of War and Peace determined that
certain rules govern the conduct of war whatever the justness of its
cause. We are far beyond the writings of Grotius today in terms of
the elaborateness of the international legal framework, including the
one governing armed conflict, yet we remain in his debt. He not only
paved the way to our current thinking but showed us that complexity
may—and can only be—addressed with reason, vision, and
humanity.
What does complexity mean when armed conflict is the reference
point for analysis? It means, first of all, that armed conflicts remain a
tragic reality in the twenty-first century and that enormous human
suffering continues to be caused by this form of violence. We are all
witness to continued violations of international humanitarian law,
including deliberate attacks against civilians, the destruction of
infrastructure vital to the civilian population, the forcible
displacement of entire communities from their habitual places of
residence, and various forms of sexual violence inflicted against
vulnerable individuals and groups. Persons deprived of liberty in
armed conflict are likewise frequently subject to appalling behaviour
by their captors, including murder, torture and other forms of illtreatment, deprivation of humane conditions of detention, and denial
of procedural safeguards and fair trial rights. Medical personnel and
humanitarian workers are also an increased target of attacks. The law
tries to prevent or put a stop to suffering and to deter future
violations, but it cannot, by itself, eradicate abuses or be expected to
do so.
Complexity may also be approached by examining the features of
current armed conflicts and the political, economic, and social
backdrop against which they take place—all issues which are beyond
the scope of my remarks. Allow me, nevertheless, to note that the
International Committee of the Red Cross, which has operations in
some eighty contexts around the world, is involved in a range of
situations: from those in which the most advanced technology and
weapons systems are deployed in asymmetric confrontations, to an
assortment of armed conflicts typified by low technology and high
fragmentation of the actors involved. Each case must be approached
on the particular facts and a humanitarian response devised to meet
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the specific needs of those most affected, which is by no means a
simple endeavour.
Increased complexity is also a feature of contemporary armed
conflicts, the nature of which continues to evolve. The predominant
form of armed conflict nowadays is non-international, often
stemming from state weakness that leaves room for armed groups to
take matters into their own hands based on—real or perceived—
political, ethnic, or religious grievances. Some non-international
armed conflicts are predominantly economically driven and revolve
around struggles for access to key natural resources. Whatever the
case, non-state armed groups tend to live off the civilian population
and engage in appalling acts of brutality to ensure control, instil fear,
and obtain new recruits. They frequently resort to looting and
trafficking, extortion and kidnapping, as well as other acts amounting
to profitable economic strategies that are sustained by the general
lawlessness and by national, regional, and international economic
and political interests. Thus, the coexistence of violence stemming
from armed conflict and that linked to various forms of banditry and
the blurring of lines between armed conflict and crime, including
transnational, has become a complex reality defying easy practical or
legal solutions.
The world is further beset by the combined effects of political,
economic, and financial crises. Food prices continue to rise, affecting
countless people already suffering from the effects of armed conflict.
These trends, when compounded with the ravages of natural
disasters, including drought and floods, are likely to continue to fuel
unrest and armed conflicts in the years ahead.
Some of these characteristics are also present in situations of
violence below the threshold of armed conflict, including instances
of state repression, inter-communal strife, and urban violence. The
humanitarian needs in these contexts may be just as grave as in
situations of armed conflict. The ICRC relies on its right of
humanitarian initiative provided by the Statutes of the International
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement to come to the aid of persons
or communities in need when, among other things, its operational
involvement is assessed as being of added value.
The very brief outline of current trends in armed conflict and other
situations of violence begs the question of whether reality is really
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becoming increasingly complex or whether, thanks to technology
and new means of communication, we have more facts at our
disposal. I will not attempt to answer it because the more important
question, in my view, is: how do we use international law to address
complexity, whether it is indeed increasing or is just perceived to be
that. Based on historical observation and on an analysis of events
over the past decade, I would submit that states and other actors have
given essentially three responses.
When faced with impending or actual crises, domestic and
international institutions have sometimes chosen to abstain from
action. An obvious and tragic example was the inability of states to
finalize a convention on the protection of civilians ahead of the
Second World War, which contributed to the unspeakable
consequences that we are all familiar with. On other occasions, the
real or perceived complexity of a domestic or international crisis has
led states to claim that existing law is not suited to the new
circumstances at hand, resulting in the wholesale or partial rejection
of longstanding and well-established precepts. This approach, when
the legal framework in question is IHL, has the effect of depriving of
protection the very persons it was designed to apply to. We are also
familiar with the consequences of this option. A third approach,
fortunately the most common, has been to uphold existing law in the
face of new challenges, whether real or perceived, and to analyze
that which is possibly new with a view to devising appropriate
solutions. Over the course of the last years, this has also been the
ICRC’s approach. The organization has tried to understand and
assess the reality of contemporary armed conflicts and to propose
answers to some of the salient questions without departing from the
balance underlying IHL, which is that between military necessity and
the imperative of humanity.
Allow me to briefly touch upon another issue affecting the ability
to resolve complexity through law, which is the relationship between
international and domestic law. To begin with, the universality of a
given norm may be hampered by the fact that a state may choose not
to become a party to an international treaty. This may happen even if
it took part in the negotiating process and obtained concessions from
the other participants, with the implicit expectation that such
accommodations will facilitate its signature and ratification. A state
may also sign a treaty, but eventually not ratify or accede to it for a
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variety of reasons, including domestic political considerations. While
a state in this case may not act contrary to the treaty’s object and
purpose, it is nevertheless not bound by it. Even when states do agree
on the content of a treaty and agree to be bound by it at the
international level, implementation in a domestic legal system
oftentimes remains uncertain, particularly if a treaty needs to be
previously incorporated by means of domestic law. Thus, a key legal
requirement at the national level may be missing.
A further and important cause of complexity is the way in which
domestic courts approach and interpret international norms. Some
courts ensure that a state complies with its international obligations,
while others may choose to disregard international law. Approaches
to customary international law and its acceptance by domestic courts
also vary widely. This creates particular uncertainty in the area of
international humanitarian law, which was initially customary law
based, and in which customary law rules still constitute an important
source of legal obligations. If customary law is disregarded, then the
minimum safeguards provided for in IHL will not be implemented.
I do not, of course, have a solution to the complexity arising from
the interplay of international and domestic law. I simply want to note
that the uneven application of international law at the domestic level
may give rise to the justified perception that international law cannot
ensure consistent and equal outcomes when its rules are violated. In
the IHL context this means, for example, that, depending on the
operation of the variables I have outlined above, persons suspected
of war crimes will in some cases be brought to justice, while others
will escape it. States and other actors are thus called on to do their
utmost to ensure that IHL performs its protective function in any
situation in which it is legally binding. Applying it in good faith is
always an indispensable starting point.
Ladies and gentlemen,
I would now like to turn to certain practical challenges related to
situations of armed conflict and offer some remarks on how
international humanitarian law may be used to address them. The
topics are by no means exhaustive and include the classification of
armed conflicts, the rules on detention related to armed conflict, the
need to improve compliance with IHL, and the role of IHL in the
face of new technologies of warfare. In some cases, we have the
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advantage of hindsight. Other challenges are ongoing. Others are
developing.
A key legal issue that has been, and is being, debated is whether
the current IHL dichotomy—under which armed conflicts are
classified either as international or non-international—is sufficient to
deal with new factual scenarios, and whether new conflict
classifications are needed. The question has arisen mainly because of
the undoubted increase in non-international armed conflicts with an
extraterritorial element. A typology of such conflicts has been
outlined in the ICRC’s recent Report to the 31st International
Conference of Red Cross and Red Crescent, entitled IHL and the
Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts.
One example is a non-international armed conflict originating
within the territory of a single state between government armed
forces and one or more organized armed groups that has “spilled
over” into the territory of a neighbouring state. Another example is a
non-international armed conflict in which multinational armed forces
are fighting alongside the armed forces of a “host” state—in its
territory—against one or more organized armed groups. As the
armed conflict does not oppose two or more states (i.e., as all the
state actors are on the same side), the conflict is classified as noninternational, regardless of the international component. An
illustration of this type is the non-international armed conflict in
Afghanistan. It may also be argued that a “cross-border” noninternational armed conflict exists, possibly alongside an
international armed conflict, when the forces of a state are engaged
in hostilities with a non-state party operating from the territory of a
neighbouring state without that state’s control or support.
Yet another type of non-international armed conflict, believed by
some to exist, is the one between Al Qaeda and “associated forces”
and the United States, most often called “transnational.” It should be
recalled that the ICRC does not share the view that a conflict of such
scope, previously known as the “war against terrorism,” is taking
place. Since the horrific attacks of September 11th 2001, the ICRC
has referred to a multifaceted “fight against terrorism.” This effort
involves a variety of counter-terrorism measures on a spectrum that
starts with non-violent responses—such as intelligence gathering,
financial sanctions, judicial cooperation, and others—and includes
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the use of armed force at the other end. When armed force is used,
the ICRC has taken a case-by-case approach to legally analyzing and
classifying the various situations of violence that ensue. Some have
been classified as international armed conflicts, others as noninternational armed conflicts, while various acts of terrorism taking
place in the world have been assessed as being outside any armed
conflict. IHL rules governing the use of force and detention for
security reasons are less restrictive than the rules applicable outside
of armed conflicts governed by other bodies of international law, and
IHL should thus not be applied to situations that do not amount to
armed conflict.
It should be recalled that the key distinction between an
international and a non-international armed conflict is the quality of
the parties involved: while an international conflict presupposes the
use of armed force between two or more states, a non-international
conflict involves hostilities between a state and an organized nonstate armed group or between such groups themselves. If one surveys
armed conflicts going on in the world, there does not appear to be
any current situation that would not fall into one of the two existing
conflict classifications. Moreover, to the extent that new
classifications have been called for, they would invariably result in a
dilution of existing IHL protections, an outcome which the ICRC
could not support, for obvious reasons.
IHL rules governing detention in armed conflict have also been the
subject of much controversy over the past few years. While the
relevant rules of the Third and Fourth Geneva Convention may be
said to have withstood the test of time in international armed
conflicts, recent practice has demonstrated that IHL governing
detention in non-international armed conflict needs to be upgraded.
Based on its operational activities, the ICRC has identified specific
humanitarian concerns related to deprivation of liberty in this type of
conflict, some of which are not, or are not sufficiently, addressed by
international humanitarian law.
The first concern is poor material conditions of detention, which
may, and often do, have direct and irreversible consequences on the
physical and mental health of detainees. Detention conditions for
persons under the control of a non-governmental armed group are
oftentimes nothing less than dire, owing to lack of resources and
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organization. Poor material conditions of detention commonly mean
lack of adequate food, water, and clothing, as well as insufficient
medical care. Detention facilities themselves are frequently
unsuitable. Detainees often have limited contact with their families
and are sometimes prohibited to see them even though family contact
is both a legal obligation and constitutes sound detention policy.
There is likewise a failure to register detainees, or to separate the
different categories one from the other, or to allow detainees to
practice their religion. Last but not least, overcrowding is a
permanent characteristic of many places of detention. While
objective circumstances are in some cases the cause, in many others
inefficient or non-existent legal processes unnecessarily prolong
detention or even prevent release.
While IHL contains detailed rules on conditions of detention in
international armed conflicts, this is not the case in conflicts not of
an international character, especially those governed by Article 3
common to the Geneva Conventions. Additional Protocol II provides
an essential set of rules, but they are not sufficiently comprehensive,
and the relevant norms of customary IHL are necessarily formulated
in general terms.
In addition to the general protection applicable to all persons
detained for reasons related to a non-international armed conflict,
further provisions are necessary to address the specific needs of
certain categories of persons. The situation of women, for instance,
requires special attention. Children should also be better protected,
and the needs of other categories of persons, such as the elderly and
the disabled, should likewise be reflected in IHL governing noninternational armed conflicts.
A particular humanitarian concern related to detention in noninternational armed conflict is the lack of procedural safeguards for
persons subject to internment. As already mentioned, most conflicts
nowadays are non-international, and internment is widely practiced.
In the absence of IHL norms, states often resort to policy directives
or apply domestic law, neither of which has proven to be satisfactory
from a protection standpoint. In practice, internees are not adequately
informed of the reasons for their internment, and an established
process allowing them to challenge the lawfulness of their detention
and to obtain release if the reasons do not or no longer exist is
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lacking. Regular, six-monthly periodic review is also missing.
Uncertainty about one’s legal situation is often compounded by
prohibitions or restrictions on contact with the outside world,
including families, leading to tensions within detention facilities that
could be avoided.
Let me insert a bracket here and note the increasingly widespread
use of the term “indefinite detention” as being synonymous with
“law of war” detention. This is very unfortunate, as it may serve to
create a perception of acceptability where none should exist. With
the exception of prisoner-of-war internment in international armed
conflict, the internment of any other person for imperative reasons of
security in international armed conflict must end as soon as the
reasons justifying it cease to exist. The same rule should be applied
by analogy to internment in non-international armed conflicts. Initial
and periodic review processes are provided for precisely because
there is no assumption that a person will automatically constitute an
imperative security threat until the end of an armed conflict. Each
case has to be examined initially on the merits, and periodically
thereafter, to assess whether the threat level posed remains the same.
In view of the rapid progression of events in armed conflict, the
assessment may, and in most cases does, change. There is also the
outer temporal limit of internment, which is the close of active
hostilities. Thus, to somehow imply that IHL allows indefinite
detention as such risks misrepresenting the spirit and letter of this
body of rules.
The reality and the urgency of the humanitarian problem caused
by lack of procedural safeguards for internment in non-international
armed conflicts is, to us, evident. Whether internment takes place in
a state’s own territory or is undertaken by states engaged abroad as
part of a multinational coalition with a “host” state’s consent, the
absence of binding IHL rules has allowed divergent approaches to
ensuring the procedural rights of internees. Customary IHL prohibits
arbitrary deprivation of liberty but does not provide criteria for
determining what is “arbitrary.” Article 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions contains no provisions regulating internment, apart
from the requirement of humane treatment. Additional Protocol II
mentions internment in Articles 5 and 6 respectively but likewise
does not give details on how it is to be organized. In order to provide
guidance to its delegations for their operational dialogue with states
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and non-state armed groups, in 2005 the ICRC adopted an
institutional position on procedural safeguards for internment. That
position has served as a basis for bilateral discussions in a range of
contexts in which internment for security reasons is being practiced
and is believed to present a workable starting point for examining the
key legal issues that arise.
The transfer of persons between states has also emerged as one of
the defining features of armed conflicts over the past several years,
particularly in situations where multinational forces transfer persons
to a “host” state, to their country of origin, or to a third state. There is
cause for concern from a humanitarian standpoint whenever there is
a risk that a transferred person may be subject to serious violations,
such as arbitrary deprivation of life, torture, and other forms of illtreatment or persecution upon transfer.
The ICRC’s focus on the issue of transfers has arisen as a result of,
broadly speaking, two operational situations. First, when persons it
visits express concern that they will be at risk of violations upon
transfer to the receiving state. Second, as a result of visits to persons
who have been transferred, during which the ICRC observes that
transferees have been subjected to prohibited treatment. The general
international law principle prohibiting transfers to situations of
abuse, known as non-refoulement, is not, however, explicitly
provided for in IHL governing non-international armed conflicts.
The lack of legal provisions suggests that it would be advisable to
provide for a set of workable substantive and procedural rules that
would both guide the action of states and non-state armed groups and
protect the rights of affected persons. Current practice, in which
more and more non-international armed conflicts involve coalitions
of states fighting one or more non-governmental armed groups in a
“host” country, indicates that uncertainty about how to organize a
lawful transfer regime, including with regard to post-transfer
responsibilities, is likely to increase, rather than decrease.
These and other issues—including the need to ensure ICRC access
to persons detained in non-international armed conflicts—were the
subject of an internal ICRC study and then a Report to the 31st
International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent entitled
Strengthening Legal Protection for Victims of Armed Conflicts. A
Conference resolution of the same name invited the ICRC to pursue
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further research, consultation, and discussion in cooperation with
states in order to identify and propose a range of options on how to
ensure that IHL remains relevant in protecting persons deprived of
their liberty in relation to armed conflict.
The other issue that the ICRC was similarly invited to work on by
the Conference is enhancing and ensuring the effectiveness of IHL
compliance mechanisms. This is a humanitarian imperative that must
be addressed, because lack of respect for IHL remains, as I have
noted above, the primary reason for enormous human suffering in
armed conflicts.
Special emphasis has been placed in the past two decades, in
particular, on developing mechanisms to ensure individual criminal
responsibility for crimes under international law, including war
crimes. States have enacted and implemented domestic legislation
enabling them to prosecute perpetrators. The establishment of
international criminal tribunals and the International Criminal Court
are also invaluable steps in the effort to combat impunity. The Rome
Statute provides a list of war crimes, including those that may be
committed in non-international armed conflicts. However, although
significant, these measures are not, by themselves, sufficient. The
punishment of war criminals takes place once atrocities have been
committed, which is often years after the events, while victims’
needs are immediate and require mechanisms that are available to
prevent violations and to halt them during armed conflict.
It has not been possible to meet this need with the machinery
provided for in the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I—
the system of Protecting Powers, the formal enquiry procedure, and
the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission. The
Commission, in particular, has never been called upon to act,
although it has been ready to do so since 1991. The main reason is
that the actual operation of the existing mechanisms requires the
consent of the parties concerned.
In practice, it is mainly the ICRC that carries out certain
supervisory tasks, such as visits to prisons, protection of the civilian
population, confidential representations in the event of violations of
humanitarian law, and so on. However, there are certain limits to the
ICRC’s role that are inherent to its mission and working methods. It
is not the ICRC’s policy to publicly condemn actors responsible for
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violations of IHL. Except in strictly defined circumstances, the ICRC
focuses on a confidential bilateral dialogue with the parties to a
conflict, the purpose of which is to gain direct access to affected
persons and to persuade the parties responsible for violations to
change their behaviour and meet their obligations. Also, the ICRC
does not necessarily have the formal authority to act in every case. In
non-international armed conflicts, its ability to operate is subject to
the consent of the parties involved through an offer of services.
Fortunately, the offer is in most cases accepted.
The mechanisms provided for in IHL are, admittedly, not the only
ones that may be relied on to protect persons in time of armed
conflict. The United Nations system has for many years been
involved in monitoring behaviour in armed conflicts, in particular
through the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Human
Rights Council. Although these mechanisms sometimes include the
establishment of independent procedures (commissions of inquiry,
special rapporteurs), final decisions are often subject to political
negotiation. And while diplomatic channels are a necessary means
for implementing international humanitarian law, they also have
limits. First, it is not certain that these channels are really an
alternative to IHL mechanisms. Indeed, violations persist in many
cases despite monitoring by the UN bodies. What is more, given
their political dimension, intergovernmental bodies tend to be
selective. Their decisions are liable to be perceived as biased by an
involved party, which poses a problem from the point of view of
international humanitarian law.
Regional mechanisms for protecting human rights have also
helped meet the needs of victims of armed conflicts, particularly by
ruling on individual complaints. The European and Inter-American
human rights courts have made significant contributions to
establishing justice, truth, and reparation, but they cannot
compensate for the absence of a monitoring system specific to IHL.
Their jurisdiction is limited to certain geographical zones, and their
decisions are in principle based on the applicable human rights
conventions rather than on IHL, which is a different branch of
international. Very importantly, the jurisdiction of human rights
bodies does not cover non-state armed groups because, in contrast to
IHL, human rights law does not, as a rule, bind such groups. The
practice of regional mechanisms for protecting human rights can
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therefore not make up for the absence of a fully effective mechanism
specific to humanitarian law. It is liable to call into question the
primacy of international humanitarian law as the specific legal
framework for protecting the victims of armed conflicts, and to
weaken its universality and coherence.
Thus, although the contribution of the United Nations and regional
bodies must not be overlooked, the reality of contemporary armed
conflicts demonstrates that the issue of sufficient and effective
monitoring mechanisms has not yet been resolved. The question thus
arises as to how the monitoring system established under IHL could
be strengthened. Should the existing procedures (Protecting Powers,
formal enquiry procedure, International Humanitarian Fact-Finding
Commission) be modified with a view to ensuring that they operate
effectively in all armed conflicts? Is it preferable to create new
mechanisms that are better suited to contemporary realities? If so,
what parameters should be taken into account to ensure that these
mechanisms are effective?
Many proposals have been put forward on the subject in the course
of the normative history of international humanitarian law. When the
Geneva Conventions were being drafted, it was proposed, for
example, that a “High International Committee” be established,
which would be in charge of monitoring the Conventions’
application. Some twenty years later, the UN Secretary-General
suggested that an “Observer-General” or “Commissioner-General”
be appointed who would be in charge of setting up and running a
system of asylum or refuge for civilian populations affected by
armed conflicts. When the 1977 Additional Protocols were being
drafted, the ICRC also put forward several options, pointing to the
potential role of existing international or regional organizations or
suggesting that an ad hoc commission be set up. More recently, the
UN Secretary-General also suggested, in his Millennium Summit
report, that a mechanism be established for monitoring the
application of the provisions of international humanitarian law by the
parties to conflicts. Lastly, in 2003, the ICRC launched a wideranging consultation process on the subject. The experts, including
governmental, who were invited to take part mentioned the
possibility of setting up one or several mechanisms that could carry
out new functions to monitor respect for IHL: among them, a
reporting system, an individual complaints mechanism, fact-finding
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missions, and the quasi-judicial investigation of violations.
These and other ideas related to IHL compliance mechanisms will
be the subject of further examination and work that the ICRC intends
to conduct with the Government of Switzerland, which has likewise
undertaken to explore and identify concrete ways in which the
application of IHL may be strengthened.
Ladies and gentlemen,
Before I draw to a close, allow me to briefly draw your attention to
a developing issue that is causing some complexity in the legal field.
I refer to the legal regulation of cyberspace and, more specifically, to
the role of IHL in regulating what has become known as “cyber
warfare,” the subject of much discussion nowadays.
In recent years a wide array of new technologies has entered the
modern battlefield. Cyberspace has opened up a potentially new warfighting domain, a man-made theatre of war additional to the natural
theatres of land, air, sea, and outer space. It provides worldwide
interconnectivity regardless of borders, which means that whatever
has an interface with the Internet can be targeted from anywhere in
the world. Interconnectivity also means that the effects of a cyber
attack may have repercussions on various other systems, given that
military networks are in many cases dependent on commercial
infrastructure.
The fact that a particular military activity is not specifically
regulated does not mean that it can be used without restrictions.
Means and methods of warfare which resort to cyber technology are
subject to IHL just as any new weapon or delivery system has been
so far. If a cyber operation is undertaken against an enemy in an
armed conflict in order to cause damage, it can hardly be disputed
that such an attack is in fact a method of warfare and is subject to
prohibitions under IHL.
Reconciling the emergence of cyberspace as a new war-fighting
domain with the legal framework governing armed conflict is
nevertheless a challenging task in several respects and requires
careful reflection. A few issues being debated include:
First, the digitalization on which cyberspace is built ensures
anonymity and complicates the attribution of conduct. Thus, in most
cases, it appears difficult if not impossible to identify the author of
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an attack. Given that IHL relies on the attribution of responsibility to
individuals and parties to conflicts, major difficulties arise. In
particular, if the perpetrator of an operation and thus its link to an
armed conflict cannot be identified, it is extremely difficult to
determine whether IHL is even applicable.
Second, there is no doubt that an armed conflict exists and IHL
applies once traditional kinetic weapons are used in combination
with cyber operations. However, a particularly difficult situation as
regards the applicability of IHL arises when the first, or the only,
“hostile” acts are conducted by means of a cyber operation. Can this
be qualified as constituting an armed conflict within the meaning of
the Geneva Conventions and other IHL treaties? Does it depend on
the type of operation, that is, would the manipulation or deletion of
data suffice, or is physical damage as the result of a manipulation
required? It would appear that the answer to these questions will
probably be determined in a definite manner only through future
state practice.
Third, the definition of the term “attack” is of decisive importance
for the application of the various rules giving effect to the IHL
principle of distinction. Additional Protocol I and customary IHL
contain a specific definition of the term which is not identical to that
provided for in other branches of law. Under Additional Protocol I,
“attacks” means acts of violence against the adversary, whether in
offence or defence. The term “acts of violence” denotes physical
force. Based on that interpretation, which the ICRC shares, cyber
operations by means of viruses, worms, etc. that result namely in
physical damage to persons or damage to objects that goes beyond
the computer program or data attacked could be qualified as “acts of
violence” and therefore an attack in the sense of IHL.
Fourth, when cyber operations constitute an attack, Additional
Protocol I imposes the obligation to direct attacks only against
“military objectives,” prohibits indiscriminate and disproportionate
attacks, and imposes an obligation to take precautions in attack.
These rules operate in the same way whether an attack is carried out
by means of traditional weapons or by reliance on a computer
network. Problems that arise in their application are therefore not
necessarily unique to cyber operations, but many questions can be
posed.
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Based on what is publicly known about cyber operations thus far,
ensuring compliance with the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks
poses very serious challenges. One issue is whether cyber operations
may be accurately aimed at an intended target and, even if so,
whether indiscriminate effects upon civilian infrastructure could be
prevented due to the interconnectedness of military and civilian
computer networks. As regards the prohibition of disproportionate
attacks, one of the queries is whether it is in practice possible to fully
anticipate all the reverberating consequences/knock-on effects on
civilians and civilian objects of an attack otherwise directed at a
legitimate military objective.
Respect for the principles of distinction and proportionality means
that certain precautions in attack must be taken. Given that, in certain
cases, cyber operations might actually cause less incidental harm to
civilians or civilian objects than conventional weapons, it may be
argued that the precautionary rule would require a commander to
consider whether he or she could achieve the same military
advantage by using cyber technology if practicable.
I would like to reiterate that despite the newness of the technology
and some of the issues just raised, IHL constraints do apply to means
and methods of warfare which resort to cyber technology. Cyber
warfare, like any other warfare, may only be conducted with respect
for existing rules if the humanitarian goal of sparing civilians from
suffering and preventing the destruction of civilian objects is to be
preserved.
Ladies and gentlemen,
I would like to end my remarks by recalling something I noted at
the beginning. Hugo Grotius’s work shows us that complexity may,
and must be, addressed through law by the application of reason,
vision, and humanity. Reason means, among other things of course,
that the validity of existing international norms must be
acknowledged and that the relevant rules must be implemented, until
changes are agreed to. Any other approach risks unravelling the
hard-won compromises that constitute international law and would
jeopardize the baseline that states have established for resolving
issues of common concern. In the area of international humanitarian
law in particular, rejection or misinterpretation of the rules cannot be
limited to one side only, as armed conflict by definition involves at
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least two parties. If one of them changes the goal posts in the middle
of an armed conflict, the other may do so as well, with immediate
and tragic consequences for those whom IHL was designed to
protect. Differently put, it should be borne in mind that hasty legal
responses to new challenges often generate more, not less,
complexity.
An approach to international law, including IHL, based on vision
means that there is a capacity and willingness to recognize and
analyze what is new, and a readiness to effect change if necessary. In
the area of international law, change is possible, and is most easily
achieved, where states come together for the common good and are
prepared to accommodate different views in the process of finding
solutions. Resolving some of the challenges in the area of
international humanitarian law that I have outlined above will
undoubtedly require vision. The ICRC stands ready to assist states in
this regard, based on the mandate entrusted to it by the parties to the
treaties of international humanitarian law and the Statutes of the
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.
As for humanity, it is a broad concept that can be applied to many
areas of human endeavour, including the law. It is the foundation
stone of the entire edifice of IHL and must continue to permeate both
the application of existing rules and the crafting of news ones, if
deemed necessary. And, even though the principle defies precise
legal definition, its observance in armed conflict always has
immediate results: it helps save lives, protect the vulnerable, and
prevent suffering. It is in fact necessary that the principle of
humanity should remain just that, an overarching principle that
informs the application, interpretation, and development of IHL. It is
by its very nature an evolving concept that is given specific content
in accordance with the values of the times. Our common challenge is
to ensure that this complex notion keeps expanding.
I thank you for your attention.

